Published: August 27, 2026 | Last Technically Reviewed: August 27, 2026
Historical H3C S6500 Broadband Metro Network Field Case
- 1. Conclusion
- 2. Introduction
- 3. Historical Project Context
- 4. Where This Incident Fits in the Full S6500 Trial
- 5. The Access Interfaces Looked Healthy
- 6. Throughput Looked Normal, but Packet Loss Did Not
- 7. Traceroute Gave Us the First Important Clue
- 8. One Uplink Was Carrying Almost No Traffic
- 9. The Configuration Still Looked Correct
- 10. ARP Was Present, but the Expected Route Was Missing
- 11. The Successful Ping Was Misleading
- 12. Resetting the Interface Restored the Route
- 13. What the Development Team Found
- 14. What We Observed vs. What We Concluded
- 15. What This Case Taught Us About Layer 3 Troubleshooting
- 16. Want the Full H3C S6500 Field Troubleshooting Story?
- 17. More Real-World Network Deployment and Troubleshooting Cases
- 18. Frequently asked questions (FAQs)
- 19. Resource
Conclusion
In this historical H3C S6500 field incident, ECMP traffic sharing failed because the expected upstream route for one of two equal-cost Layer 3 uplinks was missing from the routing table, even though the interface was up, ARP was present, the peer responded to ping, and the configuration showed no obvious error. One uplink therefore carried very little traffic while most traffic used the other path. Resetting the affected interface restored the missing route and dual-uplink traffic sharing, but this was only a temporary recovery action. H3C R&D later identified a route-table programming/write abnormality as the immediate technical cause. High CPU load during bulk route writes was considered a possible deeper factor, but the surviving records do not establish it as the definitive root cause.
Introduction
During evening peak traffic, users connected through several H3C S6500 trial sites began reporting gaming lag. The affected GE access interfaces were up, interface checks showed no obvious errors, and metro-network speed tests were generally acceptable. What made the incident difficult was that the packet loss was intermittent rather than continuous.
The switch had two equal-cost Layer 3 uplinks configured, but repeated path observations and interface statistics eventually showed that only one uplink was carrying meaningful traffic.
The question was straightforward:
Why was traffic using only one uplink when both Layer 3 uplinks appeared physically healthy and the configuration looked correct?
The answer was not visible at the port level. The decisive evidence appeared only after we compared ARP state, routing-table state and the forwarding path that traffic was actually using.
Historical Project Context
This incident came from the initial field-trial period of H3C's first-generation S6500 general-purpose mid-to-high-end Layer 3 switch.
At the end of 2004, the newly developed S6500 was deployed across 112 broadband metro-network trial sites at a friendly telecom operator. As real subscriber traffic was gradually migrated onto the platform, the trial shifted from laboratory validation into production-traffic testing.
To support the trial, the S6500 R&D organization rotated two development engineers on long-term assignment locally. They worked with local IP engineers and partner engineers as a joint field-support team, collecting fault information and feeding recurring issues back to R&D.
Historical Project Note: This case is reconstructed from surviving engineering records and first-hand project experience from the original S6500 trial. Where those records do not preserve an exact software version, CLI output, traffic value, packet-loss percentage, CPU percentage or definitive deeper root cause, this article does not recreate those details.
Where This Incident Fits in the Full S6500 Trial
The ECMP incident was not the only issue exposed after the 112 trial sites began carrying real broadband traffic.
The surviving project record documents several different problem classes during the trial, including:
ARP process hang
Interface VLAN scale limitation
Forwarding/FIB programming abnormality
Route-table programming abnormality - the incident covered here
High CPU and memory utilization under abnormal traffic
Port-chip hang or failure
These were separate incidents.
In particular, the FIB programming abnormality described elsewhere in the trial must not be merged with the route-table programming abnormality in this article. They involved different symptoms and different technical findings.
This article focuses only on the route/ECMP incident because it provides a particularly useful Layer 3 troubleshooting example.
The Access Interfaces Looked Healthy
The first checks did not point toward a Layer 3 routing problem.
Field engineers inspected the affected subscriber-side GE port for:
operating mode;
interface state;
error rate;
packet-error counters.
No obvious abnormality was found. The team also visited the affected internet café during the evening peak period and checked the connected access equipment and port operating mode. Again, nothing obvious explained the gaming lag.
This matters because intermittent packet loss often pushes troubleshooting toward the physical interface first.
That is a reasonable place to start, but the absence of physical errors does not end the investigation.
Intermittent packet loss should not automatically be classified as an access-port or cabling fault.
The physical port can be operational while the forwarding state above it is incomplete.
Throughput Looked Normal, but Packet Loss Did Not
The team then tested the service from the user side.
The surviving project notes record three important checks:
speed testing inside and outside the metro network;
segmented packet-loss testing;
segmented traceroute.
The throughput tests were basically acceptable.
But the packet-loss tests showed irregular, intermittent losses. Sometimes a single test packet was lost. At other times two or three packets were lost, and occasionally four or five were lost close together.
The historical record does not preserve a packet-loss percentage, throughput value, latency figure or jitter measurement, so none should be reconstructed.
The engineering lesson from this stage is simple:
A successful throughput test does not rule out an intermittent forwarding problem.
A bulk transfer can appear acceptable while a periodic forwarding fault remains very noticeable to latency-sensitive applications such as online gaming.
Traceroute Gave Us the First Important Clue
The affected S6500 was configured with two equal-cost upstream routes.
During repeated segmented traceroute testing, however, the observed path from the user side toward the metro-network exit kept following the same upstream direction.
That observation had to be interpreted carefully.
Repeated traceroutes following the same path are not proof by themselves that ECMP is broken. Equal-cost forwarding behavior depends on the forwarding implementation and hashing behavior, and a set of probes can legitimately remain on the same path.
But in this deployment, the repeated path observation was enough to justify checking whether both configured uplinks were actually participating in forwarding.
It was the first strong clue-not the conclusion.
One Uplink Was Carrying Almost No Traffic
Back at the S6500 site, the team checked both upstream interfaces again.
This time, the inspection included:
operating mode;
interface state;
traffic statistics.
The critical observation was that one of the two upstream interfaces showed very little traffic compared with the other.
At that point, the troubleshooting hypothesis became much stronger:
Two equal-cost uplinks configured
Both physical interfaces available
Only one carries meaningful traffic
Peak traffic concentrates on one path
Congestion
Intermittent packet loss
Gaming lag
This was still a working hypothesis.
The low traffic counter showed that traffic sharing was not functioning as expected, but it did not yet explain why.
The Configuration Still Looked Correct
The team continued upward through the protocol state.
They reviewed:
VLAN configuration;
interface VLAN configuration;
routing protocol configuration.
No obvious configuration error was found.
That narrowed the problem further.
The intended topology existed in the configuration, yet the operational traffic pattern did not match it.
Correct configuration text does not always mean correct operational state.
This distinction is fundamental in Layer 3 troubleshooting.
A switch can contain the expected configuration while one of the internal protocol or forwarding states required to make that configuration operational is missing.
ARP Was Present, but the Expected Route Was Missing
The next checks produced the most important evidence in the case.
The affected uplink had a normal ARP entry.
The peer IP could also be pinged successfully.
But when the routing table was checked, the expected upstream route associated with that uplink was missing.
Troubleshooting State Table
| Check | Field Result |
| Physical uplink | Up |
| Interface configuration | No obvious issue |
| VLAN configuration | No obvious issue |
| Routing protocol configuration | No obvious issue |
| ARP | Present |
| Peer ping | Successful |
| Expected upstream route | Missing |
| ECMP traffic sharing | Not working as expected |
This combination explains why the incident was difficult to isolate.
Several individual checks looked healthy.
The physical interface was available.
The Layer 2/neighbor state existed.
Basic IP reachability worked.
The configuration appeared correct.
But the route needed for the second equal-cost path was absent.
The Successful Ping Was Misleading
The successful ping initially looked contradictory.
How could ARP be normal and the peer respond to ping if the expected route through that interface did not exist?
The working suspicion was that the ping traffic was not actually using the affected uplink.
The engineers therefore traced the peer IP itself. The path confirmed that the traffic was reaching the peer by going around through the other working upstream interface.
That resolved the apparent contradiction.
The peer was reachable.
But it was not being reached through the path the team was trying to validate.
Reachability does not prove that the expected forwarding path is being used.
That is one of the most transferable lessons from this entire trial.
A successful ping answers a reachability question. It does not necessarily validate path selection.
Resetting the Interface Restored the Route
Before making a recovery change, the field engineer collected the fault and debug information requested by the development team.
The affected uplink was then reset using a shutdown followed by an undo shutdown operation.
After the interface returned:
ARP remained normal;
the previously missing upstream route reappeared;
dual-uplink traffic sharing was verified as restored.
This distinction is critical:
The interface reset was a temporary recovery action, not the root-cause fix.
The incident should not be converted into a generic recommendation that an ECMP problem should be solved by bouncing an interface.
In this case, resetting the port restored the missing operational state and allowed the site to recover while the collected information was analyzed.
What the Development Team Found
Field teams collected fault and debug information from multiple affected sites and sent it back to the S6500 development team.
The R&D analysis ultimately identified the immediate technical problem as:
an abnormality in writing/programming the routing table.
The project record further states that excessive CPU load during large batches of route writes was considered a possible explanation for why the route-table write could become abnormal.
But the wording of the historical source matters.
It does not establish high CPU load as the fully proven underlying root cause.
The defensible conclusion is:
The development team identified abnormal route-table programming as the immediate technical cause. High CPU load during bulk route programming was considered a possible underlying factor, but the surviving engineering notes do not establish it as the definitive root cause.
That evidence boundary should remain intact.
What We Observed vs. What We Concluded
| Evidence Level | Finding |
| User-reported symptom | Peak-hour gaming lag |
| Field observation | Intermittent packet loss |
| Field observation | Repeated traceroute tests followed the same path |
| Device evidence | One uplink carried very little traffic |
| Configuration check | No obvious configuration problem |
| Protocol state | ARP entry was present |
| Reachability test | Peer ping succeeded |
| Routing state | Expected upstream route was missing |
| Path verification | Ping traffic reached peer through the other uplink |
| Troubleshooting hypothesis | One-path concentration could cause peak-time congestion |
| Temporary recovery | Interface reset restored the route |
| Verification | ECMP traffic sharing returned |
| R&D finding | Route-table programming/write abnormality |
| Possible deeper cause | High CPU during bulk route writes |
| Definitive deeper root cause | Not established in surviving records |
This distinction is important because the field symptom, the troubleshooting hypothesis, the immediate technical cause and the deeper root cause are not the same thing.
What This Case Taught Us About Layer 3 Troubleshooting
The most useful method from this incident is not a command sequence.
It is the order in which operational state was verified:
User symptom
Packet-loss test
Path observation
Uplink traffic counters
Configuration
ARP / neighbor state
Routing table
Actual forwarding path
When redundant Layer 3 uplinks appear healthy but traffic is not actually being shared, check the operational forwarding state, not only the physical interface and intended configuration.
The incident can be reduced to four states that should not be treated as equivalent:
Physical state neighbor state route state actual forwarding path
The most misleading part of this case was that almost every isolated check looked healthy: the interface was up, ARP existed, the peer responded to ping and the configuration looked correct.
The problem became visible only when the expected forwarding path was compared with the traffic actually using the two uplinks.
Reachability does not prove correct path selection.
Want the Full H3C S6500 Field Troubleshooting Story?
This article covers only one Layer 3 routing/ECMP incident from the broader 112-site S6500 trial.
The historical trial also exposed separate issues involving an ARP process hang, interface VLAN scale limitations, a distinct FIB programming abnormality, abnormal CPU/memory utilization, worm-traffic protection requirements and port-chip hang/failure. Field teams and R&D responded with troubleshooting, temporary mitigation, software changes and continued trial-site validation.
Download the complete H3C S6500 troubleshooting white paper to see how the full 112-site trial evolved and how the field and development teams responded to the other major issues encountered during deployment.
More Real-World Network Deployment and Troubleshooting Cases
The original S6500 trial was a historical carrier broadband project. Current enterprise, campus, hotel, retail and SMB networks operate with different equipment generations, software and traffic requirements.
The transferable value is the troubleshooting discipline.
Today, a project review may still require us to compare the actual topology, equipment role, port state, protocol state, routing, uplink capacity, optics, PoE, software version and interoperability rather than making a recommendation from a specification sheet alone.
You can explore our real-world network deployment and troubleshooting case studies for additional examples of design, migration and fault-isolation work.
The original S6500 in this article belongs to an earlier product generation. For current projects, current H3C enterprise switches should be evaluated according to present Layer 3 requirements, uplink capacity, redundancy, security features, supported software and the actual deployment topology.
The current products in that collection should not be interpreted as equipment used in the historical S6500 trial or as evidence that modern H3C switches share the same historical defect.
Frequently asked questions (FAQs)
Why was ECMP not load balancing on the H3C S6500 in this case?
The expected upstream route associated with one of the two equal-cost uplinks was missing from the routing table. Although the interface was physically up, ARP existed and the peer was reachable, that path was not participating in forwarding as expected. One uplink therefore carried very little traffic compared with the other.
What symptoms did users experience?
Users at affected trial sites reported gaming lag during evening peak traffic periods. Field testing also showed irregular intermittent packet loss, even though general speed tests inside and outside the metro network were basically acceptable.
The historical record does not preserve an exact packet-loss percentage, latency value or throughput figure.
Did normal interface status mean the uplinks were working correctly?
No. Both the access-side checks and later upstream-interface checks showed no obvious physical or operating-mode problem. However, one of the Layer 3 paths was not forwarding traffic correctly because its expected upstream route was absent.
This case demonstrates that:
Physical interface state does not prove complete Layer 3 forwarding state.
Did repeated traceroute results prove that ECMP had failed?
Not by themselves.
Repeated traceroutes followed the same upstream path, which was an important clue in this specific incident. But ECMP forwarding can depend on hashing and forwarding behavior, so repeated probes taking the same path are not automatically proof of a failure.
The stronger evidence came later when interface traffic statistics showed that one uplink carried very little traffic.
Why was the successful ping misleading?
Because the peer was reachable through the other working uplink.
ARP for the affected interface was present and the peer responded to ping, but the expected route for that uplink was missing. A traceroute toward the peer then confirmed that the traffic was reaching it through the alternate upstream path.
The key lesson is:
Reachability does not prove correct path selection.
What was the most important routing-table evidence?
The expected upstream route associated with the low-traffic uplink was missing, despite:
the physical uplink being up;
configuration showing no obvious problem;
ARP being present;
the peer responding to ping.
That mismatch between configuration, neighbor state and routing state was the critical clue.
Did shutdown / undo shutdown permanently fix the ECMP problem?
No.
After fault and debug information had been collected, resetting the affected interface caused the missing route to reappear and dual-uplink traffic sharing to recover.
In this case, the interface reset was a temporary recovery action, not the root-cause fix. It should not be generalized into "bounce the port whenever ECMP fails."
What root cause did H3C R&D identify?
The development team identified a route-table programming/write abnormality as the immediate technical cause after analyzing information collected from multiple affected sites.
The surviving records also mention high CPU load during large batches of route writes as a possible underlying factor, but they do not establish it as the definitive deeper root cause.
Was this the same problem as the S6500 FIB programming abnormality?
No.
The historical trial contained a separate forwarding/FIB programming incident in which forwarding information was not written correctly. That was a different fault with different symptoms and a different technical finding.
The incident in this article specifically concerns a route-table programming abnormality associated with ECMP/uplink routing behavior. The two should not be merged.
What is the main troubleshooting lesson from this case?
When redundant Layer 3 uplinks appear healthy but traffic is not actually being shared, verify the operational forwarding state, not only the physical interface and configuration.
A useful mental model from this incident is:
Physical state
≠ Neighbor state
≠ Route state
≠ Actual forwarding path
The most misleading part of the case was that individual checks appeared healthy. The fault became visible only when engineers compared the expected forwarding path with the traffic actually using the two uplinks.
Resource
Internal-Link Anchor List
complete H3C S6500 troubleshooting white paper
https://network-switch.com/pages/white-paper-troubleshooting-the-h3c-s6500-layer-3-switchreal-world network deployment and troubleshooting case studies
https://network-switch.com/blogs/case-studiescurrent H3C enterprise switches
https://network-switch.com/collections/all-h3c-switches
Troubleshooting Timeline
| Stage | Finding |
| User report | Gaming lag during evening peak |
| Access-port checks | No obvious port-state or error problem |
| User-side equipment check | No obvious configuration or port-mode problem |
| Speed test | Basically acceptable |
| Packet-loss test | Intermittent irregular loss |
| Traceroute | Repeatedly followed same upstream path |
| Uplink counters | One upstream interface carried very little traffic |
| Configuration review | No obvious VLAN/interface/routing configuration problem |
| ARP check | Present |
| Peer ping | Successful |
| Routing-table check | Expected upstream route missing |
| Peer path verification | Traffic reached peer through other uplink |
| Information collection | Fault/debug information captured |
| Temporary recovery | Interface shutdown / undo shutdown |
| Post-recovery | Route returned |
| Verification | Dual-uplink traffic sharing restored |
| R&D analysis | Route-table programming/write abnormality |
| Possible deeper cause | High CPU during bulk route writes |
| Definitive deeper trigger | Not confirmed in surviving records |
Evidence vs. Hypothesis
| Classification | Evidence |
| User-reported symptom | Peak-hour gaming lag |
| Field observation | Irregular intermittent packet loss |
| Field observation | Traceroute repeatedly showed same path |
| Device evidence | One uplink had very little traffic |
| Device evidence | Expected route missing from routing table |
| Device evidence | ARP present |
| Device evidence | Peer ping succeeded |
| Engineer hypothesis | Traffic concentrated on one uplink and congested at peak |
| Path verification | Peer traffic actually used other uplink |
| Temporary recovery | Interface reset |
| Recovery verification | Missing route returned and ECMP sharing recovered |
| R&D finding | Route-table programming/write abnormality |
| Possible underlying cause | High CPU during bulk route writes |
| Unconfirmed root cause | Definitive deeper trigger not established |
Historical Project Numbers Used
| Number | Classification | Meaning |
| 2004 | Historical project context | S6500 field-trial period began at the end of the year |
| 112 sites | Historical project fact | Broadband metro-network trial-site scale |
| 2 resident R&D engineers | Historical project fact | Development engineers rotated locally to support the trial |
No packet-loss percentage, Mbps throughput, latency, jitter, CPU percentage, exact software version or historical CLI output has been added because the source does not preserve those values.
Fact List
Original S6500 platform and 112-site trial: H3C's newly developed S6500 was deployed at 112 broadband metro-network trial locations at the end of 2004.
Trial support model: two R&D engineers rotated locally with IP and partner engineers to support production-traffic validation.
User symptom and early testing: peak-hour gaming lag, normal access-port checks, acceptable speed testing and irregular packet loss.
ECMP evidence: repeated same-path observation, one uplink with little traffic and no obvious configuration fault.
Critical routing evidence: ARP present, ping successful, expected upstream route missing, and peer traffic verified through the other uplink.
Temporary recovery: interface reset restored the missing route and equal-cost traffic sharing.
R&D finding: route-table programming/write abnormality; high CPU during bulk route writes was considered possible but not definitively established.
Separate FIB incident: the earlier forwarding/FIB programming abnormality was a different fault and must not be merged with this ECMP/routing-table incident.
Final Verification
No historical CLI has been fabricated.
No software version has been invented.
No packet-loss percentage has been added.
No throughput, latency or jitter value has been invented.
No CPU percentage has been added.
The FIB programming incident and route-table programming incident remain separate.
shutdown / undo shutdown is described only as a temporary recovery action.
High CPU is described only as a possible deeper factor, not the confirmed root cause.
No historical S6500 defect is attributed to current H3C switches.
Current H3C products are clearly separated from equipment used in the original historical project.
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